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Feature Comment: Tempering ‘Buy
American’ In The Recovery Act—
Steering Clear Of A Trade War
Regulators have begun drafting new rules to
implement the “Buy American” provisions in the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(the “Recovery Act”), P.L. 111-5. See 51 GC ¶ 60;
Peter Orszag, Director, U.S. Office of Management
and Budget, Memorandum M-09-10, Initial Implementing Guidance for the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, at 47 (Feb. 18, 2009),
available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/
memoranda_fy2009/m09-10.pdf. Specifically,
§ 1605 of the Recovery Act requires that, for public works and public buildings funded by the new
law, all iron, steel and manufactured goods be
produced in the U.S. The regulation implementing § 1605 may be published as an interim rule
and, presumably, become binding immediately
because of the need to rush implementation of
the Recovery Act.
We remain concerned that the new rule implementing the Buy American provisions may prove
one of this year’s most important procurement
measures. If not carefully drawn, the rule could help
draw the world economy deeper into a debilitating
spiral of protectionism. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner
and Christopher R. Yukins, “Public Procurement:
Focus on People, Value for Money and System Integrity, Not Protectionism,” in The Collapse of Global
Trade, Murky Protectionism, and the Crisis: Recommendations for the G20, at 87 (Richard Baldwin
and Simon Evenett eds.) (March 2009), available
at www.voxeu.org; Robert D. Anderson and William
4-068-509-5

E. Kovacic, “Competition Policy and Trade Liberalisation: Essential Complements to Ensure Good
Performance in Public Procurement Markets,” 2009
Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 67.
The timing could not be more delicate. This
rulemaking comes just before the April 2009 G-20
summit, when the U.S. will attempt to persuade its
(at this point, skeptical) major European trading
partners to undertake a massive, coordinated stimulus effort. See Bob Davis, “U.S. to Push for Global
Stimulus,” Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2009, at
A1. In an effort to assess and, hopefully, inform the
likely next steps, this Feature Comment reviews the
history of § 1605 and discusses a number of paths
the rule-writers may take.
Background: The Recovery Act’s Buy
American Requirements—When the Recovery
Act originally passed the House, the bill stated that
all iron and steel used in stimulus projects for public buildings or public works had to be produced in
the U.S. The Senate went further, requiring that all
iron, steel and “manufactured goods” be produced
here. Then, in response to sharp criticism that
the legislation might launch a trade war, see, e.g.,
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, “Buy
American: Bad for Jobs, Worse for Reputation,” PIIE
Policy Brief 09-02 (February 2009), available at
www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb09-2.
pdf, the Senate appears to have backpedaled and
amended the bill to clarify that the Buy American
requirements must be enforced “in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements.” See, e.g., Congressional Record,
Feb. 4, 2009, at S1528; David W. Burgett, Lewis
E. Leibowitz and Andrew C. Ertley, Feature Comment, “How Will Buy America Restrictions Affect
Stimulus Spending?,” 51 GC ¶ 51; Jason Matechak,
Feature Comment, “No Way BAA: Domestic Preferences and the Stimulus Package,” 6 IGC ¶ 9.
Many assumed that the Senate’s compromise
put the trade issues to bed by stipulating that the
U.S. would comply with its preexisting international
commitments. We are not so sanguine. The revised
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legislation leaves many questions open, which, unfortunately, only nourished the anxieties of the U.S.’
trading partners.
Impacts of the Buy American Provisions—
No matter how the regulatory process turns out, we
already foresee a number of important results caused
by the Recovery Act’s Buy American provisions.
International Support for Open Markets ...:
Deeply concerned by Congress’ willingness to veer
towards protectionism, leaders from around the world
continue to press for open markets. In an address to
Congress on March 4, UK Prime Minister Gordon
Brown asked:
But should we succumb to a race to the bottom
and to a protectionism that history tells us that
in the end protects no one? No. We should have
the confidence, America and Britain most of all,
that we can seize the global opportunities ahead
and make the future work for us ... . [W]e win
our future not by retreating from the world but
by engaging with it.

Canada’s ambassador to the U.S. voiced the same
concerns in comments made during the congressional
debate on the Recovery Act: “We are concerned about
contagion, that is, other countries also following protectionist policies. If Buy America becomes part of the
stimulus legislation, the United States will lose the
moral authority to pressure others not to introduce
protectionist policies. A rush of protectionist actions
could create a downward spiral like the world experienced in the 1930s.” See Congressional Record,
Feb. 4, 2009, at S1529 (quoted by Sen. John McCain
(R-Ariz.)).
... Including Open Procurement Markets: Ironically, while Congress passed protectionist legislation to
shelter U.S. procurement, the European Commission
reacted in exactly the opposite way: only a month or
so earlier, the Commission issued a formal communication urging that “[w]e must ... maintain our commitment to open markets across the globe, keeping
our own market as open as possible and insisting that
third countries do the same, in particular by ensuring
compliance with WTO rules.” To preserve that commitment to open markets, the Commission urged,
Europe “should take renewed action to ... [c]ontinue
dialogues with key bilateral partners such as China,
India, Brazil and Russia and use them to address”
market opening in various sectors, including public
procurement. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Council,

“A European Economic Recovery Plan,” COM(2008)
800 final, at 18 (Brussels, Nov. 26, 2008), available at
ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/
Comm_20081126.pdf.
Increased Pressure on Nations Outside the “Walled
Garden” of U.S. Procurement: The U.S. takes a special
approach to its free trade agreements in procurement,
in which reciprocity, rather than openness, serves
as the ultimate touchstone. To encourage other nations to join agreements, the U.S. generally excludes
from the federal market those nations that have
not yet joined the U.S.’ trade agreements. See, e.g.,
Christopher R. Yukins and Steven L. Schooner, “Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments to a Global
Public Procurement Market,” 38 Geo. J. Int’l L. 529
(2007), available at ssrn.com/abstract=1002446. The
excluded nations—including China, which is only now
moving to join the WTO Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA), and India, which is not—alarmed
by their exclusion from the hundreds of billions of
dollars funded by the Recovery Act, may sense an
increased level of urgency to enter into U.S. free trade
arrangements.
The true impact of the Recovery Act’s “Buy
American” provisions will only be known when the
implementing rule is issued. What shape, then, should
that new rule take? As noted, the rule may well have
repercussions far beyond the U.S., especially if the rule
embraces protectionism in the midst of the current
economic storm. Cf. Jeffrey E. Garten, “The Dangers of
Turning Inward,” Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2009;
Burton G. Malkiel, “Congress Wants a Trade War,”
Wall Street Journal, Feb. 5, 2009. Thus, the regulators—those drafting the implementing provisions for
the Federal Acquisition Regulation—should be mindful
of the rule’s political context, both here and abroad.
The Perils of Rulemaking: Domestic and
Global Political Contexts—The procurement
regulators face a checkered political landscape, for
the Obama administration earlier may have sent
mixed messages. On the campaign trail, candidate
Obama bemoaned the (since-overturned) award of
the Air Force tanker contract to a team including
EADS over Boeing, and implied it was hard for him
to believe that “an American company that has been
a traditional source of aeronautic excellence” was
not the preferred outcome. Candidate Obama also
pledged to “fight to ensure that public contracts are
awarded to companies that are committed to American workers.”
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But much has changed in the few months since
the election. Most of the world has plummeted into
a daunting recession with the potential to spawn a
long-term depression, see, e.g., Anthony Faiola, “U.S.
Downturn Dragging World Into Recession,” Washington Post, March 9, 2009, at A01, and history offers
too many lessons against resorting to protectionism
in the face of economic collapse. The Obama administration’s public positions echo those lessons. In joint
comments with Prime Minister Gordon Brown, for
example, President Obama noted, “Globalization can
be an enormous force for good. And one of the things
we’ve talked about repeatedly is that countries in this
crisis cannot start turning inward and try to erect
protectionist barriers. We should encourage trade.”
Remarks by President Obama and British Prime
Minister After Meeting, March 3, 2009, available at
www.whitehouse.gov.
The Administration’s Procurement Agenda—True to these concerns, the Obama administration has not pressed for protectionism, as the new
administration has taken its first steps towards
procurement reform. The new administration has
instead stressed:
Containing Procurement Costs: The Recovery Act
and other economic stimulus measures will likely
drive the U.S. budget deeper into deficit spending
and mind-boggling debts for many years. To stem
that tide, the Obama administration intends to probe
expensive weapon system programs for possible
modification or termination. See President Barack
Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies re: Government Contracting,
March 4, 2009 (presidential memo), available at www.
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Memorandum-forthe-Heads-of-Executive-Departments-and-AgenciesSubject-Government-Contracting/; 51 GC ¶ 77; see
also Remarks of the President, March 4, 2009 (endorsing legislation to strengthen weapon system cost
reviews sponsored by Sens. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and
John McCain, S. 454), available at www.whitehouse.
gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-onProcurement-3/4/09/; Government Accountability
Office, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide:
Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital
Program Costs, (GAO-09-3SP) (assessment tool for
program costs), available at www.gao.gov.
Encouraging Competition and Discouraging
Cost-Reimbursement Contracting: In his presidential
memo of March 4, Obama directed OMB to issue, by
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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the end of September, Government-wide guidance to
discourage the use of noncompetitive contracts. Picking up a theme from McCain, who has long criticized
cost-reimbursement contracts as inherently wasteful,
Obama called for guidance on “the appropriate use ...
of all contract types,” consistent with § 864 of the last
defense authorization act, which calls for clearer regulation of cost-reimbursement contracts. We remain
skeptical of these priorities (although we acknowledge
that they resonate with the media).
Rebuilding the Acquisition Workforce: After
years of denial, the Federal Government is finally
awakening to the fact that its acquisition workforce desperately needs to be bolstered. See, e.g.,
“Acquisition Workload and Ineffective Oversight
Remain Top Concerns, PSC Finds,” 50 GC ¶ 433;
Professional Services Council, Acquisition in Transition: Workforce, Oversight and Mission (October
2008) (“As … in all previous surveys, workforce
issues were the number one challenge and area
of focus”), available at www.pscouncil.org/pdfs/
2008PSCProcurementPolicySurvey.pdf; Commission
on Army Acquisition and Program Management in
Expeditionary Operations, Urgent Reform Required:
Army Expeditionary Contracting (Oct. 31, 2007),
available at www.army.mil/docs/Gansler_Commission_Report_Final_071031.pdf. The presidential
memo called for OMB to issue guidance to “assist
agencies in assessing the capacity and ability of the
Federal acquisition workforce.” Of course, that is
not a complete solution, but we hope that it at least
signals a step in the right direction.
Checking Federal Outsourcing: Finally, the presidential memo called for guidance to “clarify when
governmental outsourcing for services is and is not
appropriate, consistent with section 321 of Public
Law 110-417.” Here, as elsewhere, the administration seems intent on signaling a change in tone, not
in the law: a departure from the Bush and Clinton
administrations’ support for outsourcing, but in
keeping with last year’s defense authorization act,
which already called, in § 321, for a “comprehensive
analysis and development of [a] single governmentwide definition of inherently governmental” functions that should not be outsourced. Of course, no
policy statement alone can address the root cause
of this complex phenomenon. Today, the Government
has too few civil servants and an undersized military
to fulfill the Government’s large (and ever-expanding) body of mandates.
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Thus, although the president has publicly
charted an ambitious course for procurement reform,
none of the announced initiatives calls for closing
the federal procurement system to foreign vendors.
Indeed, a core fiscal goal in this reform effort—containing procurement costs by encouraging competition—would only suffer if foreign competitors were
excluded from the procurement market. See Robert
Anderson and William Kovacic, “Competition Policy
and International Trade Liberalisation,” supra.
Foreign Concerns—At the same time, foreign
governments have made clear that they are watching
closely to see how the U.S. will implement the Buy
American provisions in the Recovery Act, and that
they are willing to fight if the implementation proves
protectionist. As the Washington Trade Daily reported
February 27:
During an extensive World Trade Organization government procurement committee
meeting …, several members—including the
European Union, Switzerland, Norway, Japan,
Canada and Israel—expressed sharp concerns
about US expansion of its Buy America provisions in a just-passed economic stimulus bill
....
The critics said the move sends a “negative”
signal to other committee members and undermines the coverage aspects of the [WTO] plurilateral agreement [on government procurement].
The European Union, in particular, took Washington to task by charging that the United States
has gone against commitments it made during
last November’s Group-of-20 leaders meeting in
Washington not to take any protectionist actions
during the current economic downturn ....
The United States told the committee that it
has yet to formulate monitoring procedures for
the implementation of the Buy America provisions. It assured members, however, that the
controversial provisions will be implemented
“fairly”—in consonance with its commitments.
... But US officials admitted that more work
needs to be done on implementation in the coming days. Washington will come back with more
information in the next committee meeting set
for May 11 to 15 … .

Id.; see also Elliot J. Feldman, “ ‘Buy American’ Gets a
Hot Reception: Despite Obama Visit, Stimulus Provisions Force Canada to Re-Examine Its Relationship
with U.S.,” Legal Times, Feb. 23, 2009; “EU Angered
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by Obama ‘Buy American’ Call,” Irish Times, Feb.
4, 2009, at 21. The challenge for U.S. regulators,
therefore, is to implement § 1605’s “Buy American”
requirements without driving the globe closer to a
trade war.
Potential Ways Forward for U.S. Regulators—The regulatory drafters must start with the
relatively spare language of statute itself. Section
1605 of the Recovery Act reads:
BUY AMERICAN
Sec. 1605. Use of American Iron, Steel, and
Manufactured Goods.
(a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used for
a project for the construction, alteration, maintenance, or repair of a public building or public
work unless all of the iron, steel, and manufactured goods used in the project are produced in
the United States.
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply in any case
or category of cases in which the head of the Federal department or agency involved finds that—
(1) applying subsection (a) would be inconsistent with the public interest;
(2) iron, steel, and the relevant manufactured
goods are not produced in the United States in
sufficient and reasonably available quantities
and of a satisfactory quality; or
(3) inclusion of iron, steel, and manufactured
goods produced in the United States will increase
the cost of the overall project by more than 25
percent.
(c) If the head of a Federal department or
agency determines that it is necessary to waive
the application of subsection (a) based on a
finding under subsection (b), the head of the department or agency shall publish in the Federal
Register a detailed written justification as to why
the provision is being waived.
(d) This section shall be applied in a manner
consistent with United States obligations under
international agreements.

P.L. 111-5, § 1605. Section 1605 thus:
• Articulated a default rule that all “iron, steel,
and manufactured goods” used in a “public
building” or “public work” funded by the Recovery Act must be produced in the U.S.
• Failed to define “public building” or “public
work.” The House version of the legislation had
defined those terms by reference to the original
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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Buy American Act, 41 USCA § 10c, to include
“airports, bridges, canals, dams, dikes, pipelines,
railroads, multiline mass transit systems, roads,
tunnels, harbors, and piers.” This more detailed
definition could narrow debate over which “public works” might be covered by the new law.
• Left unclear whether the requirement applies
only to end products ordered under contracts or
also to components.
• Left agency heads the option of waiving the
requirement for reasons of public interest, or
a defined measure of excessive cost, i.e., if the
overall cost of the project would increase by
more than 25 percent.
• Explicitly mandated an outcome “consistent
with” U.S. obligations under international agreements. The statute did not, however, state how
the new requirements could be reconciled with
the many U.S. trade agreements.
The conference report that accompanied the legislation sheds little light on Congress’ intent:
Section 1605 provides for the use of American
iron, steel and manufactured goods, except in
certain instances. Section 1605(d) is not intended to repeal by implication the President’s
authority under Title III of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. The conferees anticipate that
the Administration will rely on the authority
under 19 U.S.C. 2511(b) [affording the President
authority to waive trade barriers] to the extent
necessary to comply with U.S. obligations under
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement and under U.S. free trade agreements and
so that section 1605 will not apply to least developed countries to the same extent that it does
not apply to the parties to those international
agreements. The conferees also note that waiver
authority under section 2511(b)(2) [a special
waiver authority for nations, other than major
industrial nations, which will comply with the
GPA] has not been used.

H. Rep. No.111-16, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. 512 (2009).
The conference report thus reflects the conferees’
understanding that the U.S. would honor its trade
agreements, and that least-developed nations should
continue to be afforded special admission to the
“walled garden” of U.S. procurement, but offered little
further guidance. In light of this relatively sparse
legislative record, there are several potential ways
forward for the U.S. regulators.
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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Regulatory Option: FAR Pt. 25—The simplest, most expeditious and elegant approach would
be to fold Recovery Act procurement, when undertaken by federal agencies, into the existing regulatory structure in FAR pt. 25. The FAR describes
a decision-making process for federal contracting
officials assessing foreign goods and services. That
“decision tree” is quite complex, but it accommodates
the U.S.’ many (and sometimes overlapping) trade
agreements. If the Recovery Act’s Buy American
provisions are to defer to existing trade agreements,
then goods and services to be purchased under the
Recovery Act should simply follow the existing regulatory framework.
The existing structure in FAR pt. 25 provides
a pragmatic solution, for FAR pt. 25 both permits
and excludes foreign vendors. For procurements
over certain monetary thresholds, FAR pt. 25 accommodates vendors from nations with standing
open-market agreements with the U.S. But FAR pt.
25 also acknowledges that those larger purchases
may not go to vendors from nations that do not have
trade agreements with the U.S. (or are not leastdeveloped nations). Thus, FAR pt. 25 already excludes
nations without open-market agreements with the
U.S., such as China, and creates a (so-called) “walled
garden” for vendors from the U.S. and from nations with open-market agreements. Of course, this
means that the central goal of the Recovery Act’s §
1605—excluding non-U.S. iron, steel and manufactured goods—may already be met, in large part, by
FAR pt. 25.
This approach raises an obvious question: if the
Recovery Act can simply be folded into FAR pt. 25,
would the new law’s domestic preferences in fact
mean anything? The answer is yes, but the change
would be marginal. For example, although the “Buy
American” provisions generally would not create
new constraints for federal agencies that are already
bound by existing trade agreements, the Recovery Act
would impose new domestic content requirements
where the trade agreements do not apply—such as in
procurements by the 13 states that are not signatories
to the WTO GPA. Because the FAR does not apply
directly to state procurements using Recovery Act
funds (§ 1610 of the Recovery Act says that the FAR
will not apply to Recovery Act procurements covered
by other laws), presumably the FAR drafters could
leave to the states how to implement the new “Buy
American” requirements.
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This “short and simple” regulatory approach
also would reduce political unrest: making clear that
the Recovery Act does not carve out new exceptions
to foreign firms’ opportunities in the U.S. market
would sharply reduce concerns, and rhetoric, over
protectionism—and so would avoid fueling the fires
of protectionism abroad. Cf. Art Pine, “Hurt American?,” Congress Daily, March 9, 2009 (noting that
“Buy American” provisions in the Recovery Act have
encouraged protectionism in other nations). In the
current environment, with political concerns magnified by the economic crisis, easing the war of words
over protectionism seems a sound course.
Regulatory Option: The Specialty Metals
Model—A second approach would be to adopt the
regulatory regime normally applied to specialty
metals bought by the U.S. Defense Department. See
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Procurement
and Acquisition Policy, Restrictions on Specialty
Metals (10 U.S.C. 2533b), available at www.acq.osd.
mil/dpap/index.html (Web site chronicles evolution
of specialty metals restrictions). Under 10 USCA
§ 2533b, when DOD purchases certain major categories of items—such as aircraft, missile and space
systems, ships, tank and automotive items, weapon
systems, and ammunition—only items and components containing domestic specialty metals may be
purchased. See, e.g., “DOD Says Domestic Source
Restrictions Not Necessary for Specialty Metals,” 6
IGC ¶ 13; “DOD Final Rule Waives Specialty Metal
Restrictions On COTS Item Acquisition,” 4 IGC ¶ 93;
John W. Chierichella and David S. Gallacher, Feature
Comment, “The Continuing Saga Of Specialty Metals—Nothing Is Ever So Bad That It Cannot Be Made
Worse,” 4 IGC ¶ 26; John J. Pavlick and Rebecca E.
Pearson, “New DOD Guidance on the Berry Amendment: Still Berry After All These Years,” 42 Proc. Law.
7 (Winter 2007); Paul M. Kerlin, “Note, 1,000 Trucks
Can’t All Be Wrong: The Untenable Reality of the
Specialty Metals Requirement,” 38 Pub. Cont. L.J.
237 (2008).
There are compelling reasons, however, not to apply the specialty metals regime. First, the specialty
metals regulatory regime took years to implement.
Delaying the Recovery Act’s implementation, in
contrast, could be disastrous. Second, although the
specialty metals statute applies a domestic preference
to both end items and components, the Recovery Act
does not specifically state that its “Buy American”
protections should be extended to components as
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well as the end products actually purchased under
a contract. Experience with the specialty metals
requirement demonstrates that forcing suppliers to
ensure that components, as well as end items, meet
domestic-content requirements imposes enormously
costly compliance burdens. Also, in a curious twist,
only domestic vendors must bear this burden regarding components: foreign vendors need not ensure that
components are compliant, so long as the end product
being offered by the foreign vendor (the end product
which contains the component) is “substantially
transformed” in a designated nation. This perverse
result—sometimes known as the “Frankenstein” effect, see John W. Chierichella and David S. Gallacher,
Feature Comment, “Specialty Metals and the Berry
Amendment—Frankenstein’s Monster and Bad Domestic Policy,” 46 GC ¶ 168—could mean that foreign
vendors from nations with trade agreements with the
U.S. would actually enjoy a comparative advantage
over domestic U.S. vendors, were the Recovery Act’s
“Buy American” requirement to be funneled through
the specialty metals regime.
Regulatory Option: The Federal Transit
Funding Model—A final option is found in the
regulatory regime through which the Government
administers “Buy America” requirements in federally
funded transit projects. See 49 USCA § 5323; 49 CFR
pt. 661. This approach is superficially attractive for
its apparent symmetry. The governing federal transit
statute, much like the Recovery Act, says that federal
funds may be obligated for a transit project “only if
the steel, iron, and manufactured goods used in the
project are produced in the United States.”
From there, however, the federal transit regime
morphs into something of a quagmire. First, unlike
procurement conducted under the Recovery Act,
federal grants to state and local governments—the
typical means of funding federal transit projects—are
generally exempted from, for example, the WTO GPA.
See GPA, Appendix I Annexes—General Notes (“procurement in terms of U.S. coverage does not include
non-contractual agreements or any form of government
assistance, including cooperative agreements, grants,
loans, equity infusions, guarantees, fiscal incentives,
and governmental provision of goods and services to
persons or governmental authorities not specifically
covered under U.S. annexes to this agreement”), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/appendices_e.htm. Procurement under the Recovery Act, in
contrast, will be carried out at least in part by federal
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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agencies directly. It would be essential, therefore, to
clarify that those federal agencies are still subject to
U.S. trade agreements, for the Recovery Act specifically
states that procurements funded by the Recovery Act
will honor U.S. trade agreements.
Second, the federal transit project regulatory
regime would cause the new law’s “Buy American” requirements to apply to components, as well as the end
products listed in a contract, much as those requirements are applied to components in federally funded
transit projects. This would invite a regulatory regime
of enormous complexity. Under the federal transit
regulations, for example, although requirements for
steel and iron apply to all “construction materials
made primarily of steel or iron and used in infrastructure projects such as transit or maintenance
facilities, rail lines, and bridges,” the requirements “do
not apply to steel or iron used as components or subcomponents of other manufactured products or rolling
stock.” Manufactured products, on the other hand, are
treated differently: for a manufactured product “to be
considered produced in the United States,” all of the
manufacturing processes for the project must take
place in the U.S., and all of the components must be
of U.S. origin, though the origin of its subcomponents
is not considered relevant. 49 CFR § 661.5. Sorting
out this very complex regulatory regime in Recovery
Act projects could take years—a delay that the U.S.
economy, which desperately needs new stimulus
funds, simply cannot afford.
Conclusion—The “Buy American” requirements
in § 1605 of the Recovery Act remain extremely
controversial. Moreover, they threaten to stir protectionism—if not an outright trade war—among other

© 2009 Thomson Reuters

nations. Protectionism, most observers agree, could
be catastrophic in the current economic crisis, and
nothing in the Obama administration’s first forays
into procurement policy suggests that the new administration believes additional domestic preferences are
needed for U.S. procurement. The pending challenge
for federal regulators, therefore, will be to craft a rule
that contains the Recovery Act’s international impact,
while implementing Congress’ intent. The optimal
approach seems to be the most simple: to fold new
procurement under the Recovery Act into the existing FAR regulatory structure, which, in keeping with
the Recovery Act, accommodates the U.S.’ many trade
agreements. Bringing Recovery Act procurements
within the FAR structure would ensure that federal
agencies’ procurements adhere to those trade agreements. (In addition, this approach also dramatically
increases the likelihood that an already over-taxed
acquisition workforce can consistently apply the new
rules.) From there, the FAR drafters could leave it to
state governments (and other recipients of Recovery
Act funding) to implement the new law’s domestic
content requirements. This simple, quick and elegant
approach would be the least likely to generate new,
potentially disastrous waves of protectionism in the
critical, but treacherous, waters of global commerce.
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